This paper consists of a theoretical exercise in national defense. It is a thought paper purely conceived based on the changing security environment in ASEAN and the nations in the domain. The paper was developed for theoretically to counter the aggressive behavior of the Chinese regional ambitions. This is not designed to be pro-or against Chinese ambition but more to understand the changed narrative, mainly driven by the “top” of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) leadership.
Two main narratives exist in the debate: First, we have 36 months until 2027, and second, the ambitions of China do not match the capability, and the goalpost must be pushed further out like 2035. However, it is not a peaceful transition. The history of the Chinese Communist Party as a clandestine and revolutionary organization has also made “political warfare” central to its modus operandi . War is the stock of the times.
China’s rise and regional ambition is increasingly articulated in the political, military and economic domain. China is set to challenge the hegemonic position vis-à-vis the United States and states in the periphery of China and its neighboring countries. Our National and Defense guidance is clear: the PRC is the pacing challenge, and Russia is an acute threat. Both appear to be converging .
Throughout history, the idea of hegemony has influenced world politics and power relations, frequently resulting in notable changes to the distribution of power. Since the end of World War II, Western hegemony—especially that of the United States—has been defined by a confluence of economic domination, cultural influence, and military power. Despite its uneven implementation, this type of hegemony was founded on liberal principles that supported democracy, human rights, and free-market economics (Ikenberry, 2011). Concerns over China’s current hegemonic aspirations are heightened by the country’s radically different growth trajectory, which mainly draws on its historical legacy of centralised rule, tributary systems, and cultural supremacy.
Historically, China’s hegemonic behavior can be traced back to the tributary system of the Ming and Qing dynasties, where neighboring states were required to acknowledge the cultural and political superiority of the Chinese emperor in exchange for economic and military protection (Fairbank, 1968). This system was less about mutual respect and more about enforcing a Sinocentric world order. The tributary system also established a precedent for China’s expectation of deference from other nations, a dynamic that echoes in its modern-day Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Clarke, 2017). The historical emphasis on dominance rather than partnership starkly contrasts with the Western model of alliance-building based on shared values and mutual benefits.
Furthermore, China’s historical experiences with humiliation during the “Century of Humiliation” (1839–1949), marked by invasions, unequal treaties, and colonial exploitation, have deeply influenced its modern approach to power. The ruling Communist Party has skillfully used this narrative to justify its assertive policies in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and other contested areas, portraying these actions as necessary to restore national dignity (Callahan, 2010). This revival of historical grievances not only fuels nationalism but also legitimizes authoritarianism, making China’s hegemonic pursuits more rigid and unyielding compared to the adaptive and often self-correcting nature of Western hegemony.
Conversely, despite its shortcomings, Western hegemony has frequently been restrained by internal criticisms and changes brought about by civil society and democratic government (Nye, 2004). Such self-control mechanisms are absent from China’s hegemonic tendencies, which are rooted in authoritarianism and historical myths of superiority. China’s hegemony is historically and fundamentally more hazardous than Western domination because of its strict and expansionist policies as well as its authoritarian governance form.
The theoretical exercise outlines a strategic pre-warning system applied across the ASEAN space. The system identified and determined the political challenge to the rise of China . The Defense Posture Realignment Initiative (DPRI) is partially funded by the government of Japan and the United States . Whereas ASEAN countries have not built on a defensive capability, China has verbalized the intention of China towards Taiwan. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs mirrors this: The People’s Liberation Army aims to be ready by 2027 to absorb Taiwan. A U.S. assessment reads,
Additionally, the U.S. and our allies must develop locations that provide expeditionary airfields for dispersal and ports for distributed fleet operations. Ground forces armed with long-range weapons in the First Island Chain allow USINDOPACOM to create temporary windows of localized air and maritime superiority, enabling maneuver. Additionally, amphibious forces create and exploit temporal and geographic uncertainty to impose costs and conduct forcible entry operations.”
The following was considered: First, China has drawn a defacto new border, real and sovereignty defined. Second, it will defend sovereignty. ASEAN has none of these features. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a strategic partnership between Japan, the United States, Australia, and India, has formed. This requires a force posture and joint force laydown properly distributed west of the International Date Line (IDL), possessing the capabilities and authorities to respond to contingencies while balancing lethality and survivability . Without the United States and Japan, the strategic burden falls to defend Taiwan. But China does fear intervention and domestic discontent. Xi Jinping wrote,
“The disintegration of a regime often starts from the ideological area, political unrest and regime change may perhaps occur in a night, but ideological evolution is a long-term process. If the ideological defenses are breached, other defenses become very difficult to hold.”
Third, by design, this creates ambiguities and instabilities. For the United States and its allies, mainly the European Union, the South China Sea is an essential area of the Asia-Pacific region for three reasons: 1) it is part of a major transit route for maritime commercial traffic to and from East Asia and for the United States Navy; 2) disputes over the ownership of its many small islands, reefs, atolls, and rocks among China and several nearby Southeast Asian states, including one United States ally, the Philippines, generating tensions that results in conflict and instability; and 3) Beijing is using its growing influence to create a sphere of influence detrimental to the allies of the United States and ASEAN . Officially adopted by the Central Military Commission (CMC) in November 2003 to conduct successfully such unrestricted warfare, was noted that “All boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and non-war of military and non-military” were totally removed .
Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, warned Jake Sullivan, America’s national security adviser, that China would not accept a Philippine presence at Sabina during their meeting near Beijing on August 27th-28th . The message is clear: China is here to stay. Senior US military officials warned their Chinese counterparts against Beijing’s “dangerous” moves in the South China Sea during the first talks of their kind between the commanders .
The military buildup by China has created the fastest military build-up since Germany. The Chinese Navy is already acknowledged as being more significant than its American counterpart , often referred to as the “strong enemy” . The tremendous Asian continental power has also spent two decades investing in anti-access/area-denial weapons to push both the American Navy and Air Force back far from its shores.
This paper theorizes that China will not back down and reiterate the Chinese determination to safeguard and protect their perceived Chinese sovereignty. To counter the aggressive nature of Chinese ambitions, a defensive line of detection and deterrence must be created in the interest of ASEAN. Countries in ASEAN need new defense-related communications, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance, hypersonic, unmanned, and directed energy systems to remainahead of the threat curve. Intelligence Enhancements and Information Sharing Programs are part of the European PDI budget. No such complement is listed in the Pacific region in FY 2024/25. Only a deterrence system will achieve protection and keep an aggressive system in check.
The first line of ASEAN defense is aimed at strengthening the U.S. naval surveillance chain (“the First Island chain”) created by the U.S. Department of Defense. It establishes, through partnership part of the alliance in the region, strengthens the defense and builds up cohesion in the region.
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